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SAME-SEX UNIONS:
THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE OR
AN ASSAULT ON TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE?
Phyllis G. Bossin*
I. INTRODUCTION
In November 2003, in the landmark case of Goodridge v. Department of
Public Health,1 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that denying gay and
lesbian couples the right to marry violated the Massachusetts Constitution. Since
that time, and in direct response to that decision, there has been a flurry of activity
at both the state and national level, mostly in the form of state constitutional
amendments, directed at preventing other like decisions.2
* Certified Family Law Specialist in Ohio. Immediate past chair of the Section of Family Law of
the American Bar Association. Listed in The Best Lawyers in America for ten years. Witness before
the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary on behalf of the American Bar Association, testifying
against proposed constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage. I would like to acknowledge
the invaluable assistance of my associate, Shannon F. Eckner, Esq., in the editing and footnoting of this
article. I would also like to acknowledge Courtney Joslin, Esq., for being a never-ending resource.
1. 798 N.E.2d 941.
2. See ABA Sec. Fam. L. Working Group on Same-Sex Marriages and Non-Marital Unions, A
White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic
Partnerships 30-33, 56 nn. 207-08 (2004) (available at http://www.abanet.org/family/whitepaper/full
report.pdf) [hereinafter White Paper]. The White Paper discusses the federal Defense of Marriage Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996), and the two proposed federal constitutional amendments,
Sen. Jt. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (Nov. 25, 2003) and H.R. Jt. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (May 21, 2003), that
seek to limit marriage to opposite-sex couples. It also indicates that the following states have enacted
statutes, constitutional amendments, or executive orders restricting marriage to opposite-sex couples:
Alabama (Ala. Code § 30-1-19 (1998)); Alaska (Alaska Const. art. I, § 25; Alaska Stat. § 25.05.013
(2004)); Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-101 (West 2000)); Arkansas (Ark. Code Ann. § 9-11-109
(2002)); California (Cal. Fain. Code Ann. § 308.5 (West 2004)); Colorado (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-2-104
(2003)); Delaware (Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 101 (1999)); Florida (Fl. Stat. Ann. § 741.212 (West Supp.
2005)); Georgia (Ga. Code Ann. § 19-3-3.1 (2004)); Hawaii (Haw. Const. art. I, § 23; Haw. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 572-1 (LEXIS 1999)); Idaho (Idaho Code § 32-209 (1996)); Illinois (750 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann.
5/212 (West 1999)); Indiana (Ind. Code Ann. § 31-11-1-1 (LEXIS 2003)); Iowa (Iowa Code Ann. §
595.2 (West 2001)); Kansas (Kan. Stat. Ann. § 23-101 (1995)); Kentucky (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 402.020
(LEXIS 1999)); Louisiana (La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 89, 3520 (West 1999)); Maine (19-A Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 701 (1998)); Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 551.1 (West 2005)); Minnesota (Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 517.01 (West 1990)); Mississippi (Miss. Code Ann. § 93-1-1 (2004)); Missouri (Mo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 451.022 (West 2003)); Montana (Mont. Code Ann. § 40-1-401 (2003)); Nebraska (Neb. Const.
art. I, § 29); Nevada (Nev. Const. art. I, § 21); North Carolina (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 51-1.2 (2003)); North
Dakota (N.D. Cent. Code § 14-03-01 (2004)); Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3101.01, 3105.12 (West
Supp. 2005)); Oklahoma (Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 3.1 (West 2001)); Pennsylvania (23 Pa. Consol. Stat.
Ann. § 1704 (West 2001)); South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. § 20-1-15 (Supp. 2004)); South Dakota
(S.D. Codified Laws § 25-1-1 (2004)); Tennessee (Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-113 (1996)); Utah (Utah
1
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The debate concerning the rights of same-sex couples began long before the
Goodridge case was decided. This debate has taken place in Congress and in state
legislatures, in state and federal courts, and in corporate America. A cursory
review of the literature on this subject reveals that at least twenty books and
hundreds of law review articles have been written on this subject in the past
twenty-five years.3 Same-sex couples have been fighting for equal rights and equal
protections for at least three decades, with little success. Although this activity
has long been ongoing, the issue of equal rights for gay and lesbian couples has not
been in the mainstream consciousness of most Americans. While people in
general were aware of the "gay rights movement," the public, for the most part,
was not cognizant of the various forums in which these issues were being
addressed.
The Goodridge decision, however, seized the public's collective attention
and brought the discussion to a head, causing it to become a significant issue in the
recent presidential election.4 The issue pitted those who believe that the judiciary
should be free to interpret the laws and the Constitution against those who decry
judicial activism.5 On one end of the spectrum are those who believe that the gay
Code Ann. § 30-1-2 (1998)); Virginia (Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.2 (2004)); Washington (Wash. Rev. Code
§ 26.04.010 (West Supp. 2005)); West Virginia (W. Va. Code § 48-2-104 (2004)).
3. See Paul Axel-Lute, Same-Sex Marriage: A Selective Bibliography of the Legal Literature,
http://law-library.rutgers.edu/SSM.html (last updated Feb. 9, 2005) (providing a substantial
bibliography of legal annotations, web based resources, articles, and laws concerning same-sex
marriage); Paul Axel-Lute, Same-Sex Marriage, http://www-rci.rutgers.edu/-axellute/ssm.htm (last
updated Sept. 19, 2002) (providing a bibliography of legislation, caselaw, monographs, law review
articles, periodicals, and websites addressing same-sex marriage current up to October 1996).
4. See e.g. BBC News, Bush Calls for Gay Marriage Ban: President George W. Bush Has Endorsed
a Constitutional Amendment that Would Ban Marriages of Same-Sex Couples, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/
hi/world/americas/3518117.stm (last updated Feb. 24, 2004); Michael C. Dorf, The Likely Impact of the
Presidential Election on the Supreme Court, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/07/07/dorf.scotus.elections/
(July 7, 2004); Howard Fineman & T. Trent Gegax, "My Mommies Can Marry": A Ruling Green-
Lighting Gay Marriage Echoes Loudly through the Country-and in the 2004 Campaign, Newsweek 34
(Dec. 1, 2003); Mitch Frank, Where Do They Stand on Gay Marriage? Time 30 (Mar. 8, 2004); David
D. Kirkpatrick, Bush's Push for Marriage Falls Short for Conservatives, 153 N.Y. Times A18 (Jan. 15,
2004); Robert Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans $1.5 Billion Drive for Promotion of Marriage:
Officials Try to Address Conservatives' Concerns, 153 N.Y. Times Al (Jan. 14, 2004); Debra
Rosenberg & Karen Breslau, Winning the "Values" Vote: It Was on 11 Ballots, and Won on All of
Them. How the Anti-Gay-Marriage Initiatives Shaped the Presidential Contest, Newsweek 23 (Nov. 15,
2004); wbur.org, The Gay Marriage Wedge in Election 2004, http://www.here-now.org/shows/2004/02/
200402103.asp (Feb. 10, 2004).
5. See e.g. Sen. Jud. Comm., A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional
Marriage, 108th Cong. 1-5 (Mar. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage]
(available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108-senate-hearings&docid=
f:98156.wais) (statement of Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.)) (criticizing judicial activism, stating that "the
only reason we are here today is that activist judges have inserted their personal political agenda into
our nation's most important legal document, our U.S. Constitution" and insisting that such judges are
"accusing ordinary Americans of prejudice, while abolishing American traditions by judicial fiat," with
the resulting necessity of a constitutional amendment "to save laws deemed 'unconstitutional' by
activist judges"); CNN.com, Massachusetts Court Rules Ban on Gay Marriage Unconstitutional,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/11/18/samesex.marriage.ruling/index.html (Feb. 4, 2004); Mary
Mostert, Did Judge Marshall Collude with Lesbian Buddies on Same-Sex Marriage Decision?
http://www.conservativetruth.org/article.php?id=2014 (Nov. 24, 2003).
2
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rights movement is the next civil rights struggle.6 On the other end are those who
believe that homosexuality violates moral and religious values and that same-sex
couples should, therefore, have limited, or no, legal rights The latter group
contends that this movement is nothing short of an all-out assault on the
institution of marriage itself and that giving same-sex couples rights to marry or
even rights that are the equivalent of marriage will destroy the institution.s Those
favoring equal rights for same-sex couples assert that these couples are seeking to
benefit from, rather than destroy, marriage. The battle lines are drawn. This
issue, more than any other, has energized and galvanized conservative Americans,
whose mission now is a federal marriage amendment that will forever preclude the
possibility of legalizing same-sex marriage.
Part II of this article will present a historical perspective, tracing how we
arrived at the present and discussing the history of legal recognition of same-sex
relationships, including early court cases, federal and state defense of marriage
acts, the Vermont Supreme Court decision, and the subsequent civil union law and
its interstate enforcement.
Part III of this article will discuss the revolutionary year of 2003, including
the legalization of same-sex marriage in Canada, the United States Supreme Court
decision in Lawrence v. Texas,9 and the Massachusetts Supreme Court decision in
Goodridge. It will then trace the response to these decisions, including the
proposed federal marriage amendment and the various state constitutional
amendments.
Part IV will turn to the areas of law affected by issues related to same-sex
couples, including family law in particular.
6. See e.g. Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage, supra n. 5, at 15-17 (testimony of Rep.
John Lewis (D-Ga.)) (stating that the proposed Constitutional amendment "seeks to write
discrimination into the constitution," that it would "restrict[ ] the civil rights of some of our citizens,"
and that "[t]he right to liberty and happiness belongs to each of us, and on the same terms, without
regard to... sexual orientation"); Mary L. Bonauto, Civil Marriage as a Locus of Civil Rights
Struggles, 30 Human Rights Mag. 3 (Summer 2003); Josephine Ross, Riddle for Our Times: The
Continued Refusal to Apply the Miscegenation Analogy to Same-Sex Marriage, 54 Rutgers L. Rev. 999
(2002); Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: On Meaning, Free Exercise, and
Constitutional Guarantees, 33 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 597 (2002); Mark Strasser, Loving in the New
Millennium: On Equal Protection and the Right to Marry, 7 U. Chi. L. Sch. Roundtable 61 (2000);
Ralph Wedgwood, The Fundamental Argument for Same-Sex Marriage, 7 J. Political Phil. 225 (1999);
Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights for Lesbians and Gay Men and the
Intra-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 567 (1994).
7. See e.g. George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & Pol. 581 (1999);
William C. Duncan, Whither Marriage in the Law? 15 Regent U. L. Rev. 119 (2002); John Finais, The
Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations: Some Philosophical and Historical
Observations, 42 Am. J. Juris. 97 (1997); Patrick Lee & Robert P. George, What Sex Can Be: Self-
Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union, 42 Am. J. Juris. 135 (1997); Dale M. Schowengerdt, Student
Author, Defending Marriage: A Litigation Strategy to Oppose Same-Sex "Marriage," 14 Regent U. L.
Rev. 487 (2002).
8. See also Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage, supra n. 5, 123-27 (testimony of Rep.
Marilyn Musgrave (R-Colo.)) (asserting, in defense of the proposed constitutional amendment, that
"the traditional definition of marriage is likely doomed unless we amend the Constitution," and
contending that "traditional marriage-as well as our democratic system of government-is now under
attack" and that "[w]ithout traditional marriage, it is hard to see how our community will be able to
thrive").
9. 539 U.S. 558.
2005]
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Part V of the article will address the statutory protections afforded to same-
sex couples in the tiny minority of states that provide such protections, including
California, Vermont, and New Jersey.
Part VI will conclude that at some point in the future, if history repeats itself,
whether it be within years or decades, progressive constitutional interpretation
may very well allow for the expansion of rights for same-sex couples, much as
rights for other individuals and groups were expanded during the civil rights
decade.
II. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The regulation of marriage has always been within the province of the
states.10 States have historically determined who may marry, at what age they may
marry, and other conditions related to eligibility for marriage. Divorce laws have
also always been within the exclusive province of the states. At one time in this
country, the majority of states made it a crime for a white person to enter an
interracial marriage.' 1 It was not until 1967 that the United States Supreme Court
intervened, holding that laws prohibiting interracial marriage were a denial of
both due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.'2 In Loving v. Virginia," the Court stated that "[t]he
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.' ' 14 The Court reinforced
the right to marry in Zablocki v. Redhail,15 in which it emphasized that "the right
to marry is of fundamental importance' ' 16 to all individuals, is one of the "basic
civil rights of man,"' 7 and is included within "the fundamental 'right of privacy'
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."'8
The Court's decision in Loving is a classic example of the judiciary
progressively, rather than strictly, interpreting the Constitution. Only by utilizing
such an affirmative approach was the Court able to declare unconstitutional state
laws prohibiting interracial marriage. In Loving, and in the state court cases
overturning anti-miscegenation laws, the states maintained that it was within the
province of the state legislature to regulate marriage, and thus, that judicial
10. Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 850 (1997) ("[Dlomestic relations law is primarily an area of state
concern .... "); Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 597 (1989) ("Family law is an area traditionally of
state concern." (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967)
("[M]arriage is a social relation subject to the State's police power."). See also H.R. Rpt. 104-664 at 3
(July 9, 1996) ("The determination of who may marry in the United States is uniquely a function of
state law. That has always been the rule, and H.R. 3396 [the federal Defense of Marriage Act] in no
way changes that fact.").
11. White Paper, supra n. 2, at 11; see generally Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (overturning Virginia's anti-
miscegenation statute for violating the Fourteenth Amendment).
12. Loving, 388 U.S. 1.
13. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
14. Id. at 12.
15. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
16. Id. at 383.
17. Id. (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
18. Id. at 384 (citing Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
[Vol. 40:381
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intrusion was inappropriate. 9 The fundamental principal remains, however, that
20 21Article III of the Constitution,2° as well as most state constitutions, established
courts for the purpose of interpreting the law, including statutory law.
Only a few years after Loving, the first challenges were brought against state
statutes that denied homosexual couples the right to marry. The first such
reported case is that of Baker v. Nelson,22 a 1971 case in which the Minnesota
Supreme Court held that a state statute denying a same-sex couple the right to
marry did not violate the First, Eighth, Ninth, or Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court initially granted certiorari but later
dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. 23 Over the course
of the next twenty years, several other state court decisions followed suit, all of
them denying gay and lesbian couples the right to marry. 4
It was not until 1993 that a state court opened the door to the possibility that
a prohibition against gay marriage might be unconstitutional. In Baehr v. Lewin,25
the Hawaii Supreme Court held that, although same-sex marriage was not a
fundamental right,26 the state's prohibition against same-sex marriage appeared to
be both sex discrimination and a denial of equal protection under the state's
constitution. 7 The court remanded the case, instructing the lower court to hold
the statute unconstitutional unless the state could demonstrate that the
prohibition met the "strict scrutiny" test.2s Before further proceedings could take
place in the lower court,29 however, the state passed a constitutional amendment
defining marriage as between one man and one woman.30 The fallout from the
Baehr case was tremendous and immediate. It was the proverbial shot across the
bow. The most immediate and direct result outside of Hawaii was the enactment
of the federal Defense of Marriage Act.3'
19. 388 U.S. at 7-8.
20. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2(1).
21. See generally e.g. Ala. Const. art. VI; Alaska Const. art. IV; Ariz. Const. art. VI; Colo. Const.
art. VI; Del. Const. art. VI; Fla. Const. art. V; Haw. Const. art. VI; Il1. Const. art. VI; Kan. Const. art.
III; Ky. Const. pt. I, §§ 109-139; Me. Const. art. VI; N.Y. Const. art. VI; Ohio Const. art. IV; Pa. Const.
art. V; R.I. Const. art. X; S.C. Const. art. V; Tenn. Const. art. VI; Va. Const. art. VI; Wyo. Const. art.
V.
22. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
23. 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
24. E.g. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Ky. App. 1973); DeSanto v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952,
955-56 (Pa. Super. 1984); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187, 1197 (Wash. App. Div. 1 1974). Contra
Hernandez v. Robles, 2005 WL 363778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 4, 2005) (holding that denying same-sex
couples the right to marry violates the New York Constitution).
25. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
26. Id. at 57.
27. Id. at 58-67.
28. Id. at 68.
29. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996).
30. Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 ("The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-
sex couples.").
31. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
20051
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A. The Federal Defense of Marriage Act
Congress inserted itself into the regulation of marriage, traditionally a field
within the sole province of the states, with the enactment of the Defense of
Marriage Act ("DOMA"),32 which consists of two parts. The first part states as
follows:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
33possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
The second part creates the definition of marriage:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United
States, the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.
34
Thus, Congress accomplished two purposes with this Act. It defined
marriage as between one man and one woman for purposes of federal law and it
determined that no state would be required to give full faith and credit to a same-
sex marriage performed in another state. As reflected in the legislative history of
the Act, Congress was not satisfied to leave the issue of same-sex marriage solely
up to the states and was concerned that federal rights, obligations, and benefits
would or could be affected.35
A review of the legislative history of DOMA demonstrates that Congress
wanted to preclude the possibility that there would be any federal consequences,
or consequences to other states, as a result of the actions of the Hawaii court.36
Congress's visceral reaction to the Hawaii decision is evident in the beginning of
its committee report, which stated that "permitting homosexual couples to 'marry'
in Hawaii threatens to have very real consequences both on federal law and on the
laws (especially the marriage laws) of the various States., 37 The strong language
used by the committee at the beginning and throughout the report illustrates that
Congress was clearly threatened by the movement toward legalizing same-sex
marriage. Specifically, the committee stated that "it is critical to understand the
nature of the orchestrated legal assault being waged against traditional
heterosexual marriage by gay rights groups and their lawyers., 38 It is only against
32. Id.
33. Id. (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)).
34. Id. (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000)).
35. See generally H.R. Rpt. 104-664 (July 9, 1996).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2.
38. Id. at 2-3.
[Vol. 40:381
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this backdrop, the committee explained, that the motivation for DOMA can be
understood.39
The committee report traced the attempts by the gay rights movement to
legalize same-sex marriage and also discussed the division within the gay rights
community over whether same-sex marriage should be a main objective of the
movementf'4 Congress clearly expressed its deep concern over "judicial activism"
and the fact that the possibility of same-sex marriage in Hawaii came about as a
result of judicial ruling rather than legislative action, stating "the Committee does
think it significant that the threat to traditional marriage laws in Hawaii and
elsewhere has come about because two judges of one state Supreme Court have
given credence to a legal theory being advanced by gay rights lawyers.",
41
Congress declared that it was not concerned with the effects of the Baehr
decision within Hawaii; rather, the impetus for DOMA was the potential impact
for other states and for the federal government itself.42 A great deal of discussion
in the committee report is dedicated to the issue of full faith and credit.43 The
committee indicated within its report that:
Simply stated, the gay rights organizations and lawyers driving the Hawaiian
lawsuit have made plain that they consider Hawaii to be only the first step in a
national effort to win by judicial fiat the right to same-sex "marriage." And the
primary mechanism for nationalizing their break-through in Hawaii will be the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution."
Congress also expressed concern that "[u]pholding traditional morality,
encouraging procreation in the context of families, [and] encouraging
heterosexuality.., would be undermined by forcing another State to recognize
same-sex unions.,
45
Congress recognized that there is a public policy exception to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause that allows states to refuse to honor marriages from other states
that violate their own public policy. 46 Congress was not, however, willing to take
the chance that an "activist judge" might agree with those advocating that a same-
sex marriage from another state should be given full faith and credit.47 While the
committee agreed with the conclusion of law professors who testified that states
would not be required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize an out-of-
48state same-sex marriage, it also believed that this conclusion was far from
39. Id.
40. H.R. Rpt. 104-664 at 3-4.
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id. at 6-7.
43. Id. at 7-10.
44. Id. at 7.
45. H.R. Rpt. 104-664 at 7 n. 21.
46. Id. at 8 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 283(2) (1971)). See also id. at 9 n. 27
(citing, among other cases, Nev. v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979)).
47. See id. at 9.
48. Id. at 9 n. 28 (citing testimony of Lynn Wardle, L. Prof., BYU).
20051
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certain, and cited a growing body of legal scholarship that would suggest just the
49
opposite.
Congress also found it noteworthy that, by the time of its hearings, fourteen
states had already passed their own defense of marriage laws in direct response to
the Hawaii decision. ° The report commented:
The fact that these States are sufficiently concerned about their ability to
defend their marriage laws against the threat posed by the Hawaii situation is
enough to persuade the Committee that federal legislation is warranted. The States,
after all, are best-positioned to assess the legal situation within their own State; that
so many of them are not content to rely on the amorphous "public policy" exception
reveals that congressional clarification and assistance is both necessary and
appropriate.
51
Congress was not, however, motivated solely by its concerns over the
possible interpretations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause; it was also concerned
about the potential impact of the Baehr ruling on federal law.5 2 Congress has
traditionally relied on the definition of marriage as set forth by the states in
determining eligibility for federal benefits. 3 Thus, if one state defined marriage to
include same-sex couples, then the possibility would exist that individuals within
that state could make claims for federal benefits. 4 By enacting DOMA, Congress
sought to ensure that this possibility would be eliminated.
The committee also deemed it necessary to comment on the decision
56rendered by the Court in Romer v. Evans. In that case, the Court struck down an
amendment to the Colorado state constitution on the basis that it violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. This constitutional
amendment provided:
Neither the State of Colorado ... nor any of it agencies ... shall enact, adopt or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or
bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise
be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
58
The Court held that this amendment classified homosexuals not for any rational
purpose but to make them unequal to everyone else.59 Congress expressed its
consternation over this decision and gave it short shrift, finding that "[i]t is
49. H.R. Rpt. 104-664 at 9 n. 29.
50. See id. at 9-10, 10 n. 31 (indicating that Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois,
Kansas, Michigan, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Utah
had "enacted new laws designed to protect against an impending assault on their marriage laws").
51. Id. at 10.
52. Id. at 10-11.
53. Id. at 10.
54. H.R. Rpt. 104-664 at 10.
55. Id. at 11.
56. 517 U.S. 620 (1996); H.R. Rpt. 104-664 at 31.
57. 517 U.S. at 635-36.
58. Id. at 624.
59. Id. at 631-36.
[Vol. 40:381
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difficult to fathom how.., the Court majority concluded that Amendment 2 is
unconstitutional." 60 Congress apparently found it abhorrent that "Colorado
citizens who have moral, religious, or other objections to homosexuality could be
forced to employ, rent an apartment to, or otherwise associate with
homosexuals. ' '61 In fact, the committee did not understand how the Court could
fail to distinguish this case from, or even discuss, its earlier holding in Bowers v.
Hardwick,62 where it upheld a sodomy statute on the basis that the law expressed
the presumed majority opinion of the citizens of Georgia that "homosexual
sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. ' ,63 Congress then undertook an analysis of
whether the proposed DOMA was constitutional, as applied against the standard
set forth in Romer.64  Ultimately, Congress concluded that the act passed
constitutional muster, as it advances the following legitimate government
interests: "defending the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage;
defending traditional notions of morality; protecting state sovereignty and
democratic self-governance; and preserving government resources.,
65
1. Constitutional Challenges to the Federal DOMA
The federal DOMA has been challenged constitutionally, but none of the
challenges has ever been successful. In August 2004, in the first published ruling
on the constitutionality of the federal DOMA, a bankruptcy judge in the state of
Washington held that it is constitutional and that the right to marry someone of
the same sex is not a fundamental right.66 The petitioners had standing because
they were legally married in Canada and sought to have that status recognized in
their bankruptcy filing.67  They alleged that DOMA violated the Tenth
Amendment, the principles of comity, and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to
the Constitution.68
The Tenth Amendment challenge alleged that DOMA is an attempt by the
federal government to regulate domestic relations matters and is therefore
unenforceable, as marriage is not a power specifically granted to Congress
69pursuant to Article I and is therefore reserved to the states. The court found this
argument unconvincing, pointing out that DOMA applies exclusively to federal
law, not to the states, and that therefore, the Tenth Amendment does not come
into play.7 ° The court also pointed out that there is no conflict between state and
60. H.R. Rpt. 104-664 at 32.
61. Id.
62. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); H.R. Rpt. 104-664 at 32-33.
63. 478 U.S. at 196.
64. H.R. Rpt. 104-664 at 33.
65. Id.
66. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 139-40, 148 (Bankr. W.D. Wash 2004).
67. Id. at 130.
68. Id. at 131.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 133.
2005]
9
Bossin: Same-Sex Unions: The New Civil Rights Struggle or an Assault on T
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
TULSA LAW REVIEW
federal law on this issue, because the state and federal DOMAs are identical, and
thus Congress has not preempted state family law.71
The court also dismissed the debtors' assertion that comity requires that the
marriage entered into in Canada be recognized in the United States, pointing out
that there is no preference for comity when the law of a foreign nation conflicts
with a nation's own laws.72 Likewise, the court was dismissive of the debtors'
assertion that the denial of recognition of their marriage was a taking of property
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.73
The court undertook an interesting analysis as to whether it was bound by
the United States Supreme Court's summary disposition of Baker v. Nelson,74
ultimately finding that it was not bound by the decision.75 Citing authority for the
proposition that summary dispositions have limited precedential effect, the court
found that the facts before it were not on all fours with the facts in Baker and
further that there had been a substantial shift in the Supreme Court's thinking, as
evidenced by Lawrence.76 Thus, the court undertook its own analysis of whether
the right to marry someone of the same sex is a fundamental right protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.77 The court concluded that the
right to marry someone of the same sex is not a fundamental right.78 The court
also rejected the argument that the classification involved required the strict
scrutiny standard to be applied to the equal protection analysis. 79 The court then
undertook a rational basis review, discussing at length the underlying basis for
marriage laws and the state's interest in promoting stable families, and ultimately
finding that the ban on same-sex marriage was rationally related to the state's
interests in these regards.8°
In the first reported decision from a federal district court ruling on a
challenge to DOMA, a Florida district court dismissed a challenge to both the
federal DOMA and the Florida DOMA.8 1 The plaintiffs, a lesbian couple married
in Massachusetts, sued to declare the state of Florida DOMA 82 and the federal
71. Kandu, 315 B.R. at 133.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 135.
74. 409 U.S. 810; see supra nn. 22-23 and accompanying text.
75. Kandu, 315 B.R. at 135-37.
76. Id. at 136-37.
77. ld. at 138-41.
78. Id. at 140.
79. Id. at 144.
80. Kandu, 315 B.R. at 144-48.
81. Wilson v. Ake, 2005 WL 281272 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2005).
82. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 741.212 (West Supp. 2005) provides:
(1) Marriages between persons of the same sex entered into in any jurisdiction, whether
within or outside the State of Florida, the United States, or any other jurisdiction, either
domestic or foreign, or any other place or location, or relationships between persons of the
same sex which are treated as marriages in any jurisdiction, whether within or outside the
State of Florida, the United States or any other jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or
any other place or locations, are not recognized for any purpose in this state.
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DOMA unconstitutional as violative of the Full Faith and Credit, Due Process,
Equal Protection, Privileges and Immunities, and Commerce Clauses of the
83Constitution.
The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that DOMA exceeds Congress's
power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, finding that "Congress' actions are
an appropriate exercise of its power to regulate conflicts between the laws of two
different States, in this case, conflicts over the validity of same-sex marriages."
'8
Further, the court found that it was bound by the decision in Baker, where the
Supreme Court determined that the right to marry without regard to sex was not a
fundamental right protected by the Constitution. 5
The court decided that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence did
not alter this result, stating: "The Supreme Court has not explicitly or implicitly
overturned its holding in Baker or provided the lower courts, including this Court,
with any reason to believe that the holding is invalid today." 86  The court
concluded that although marriage is a fundamental right, the right to marry
someone of the same sex is not, thereby negating the necessity of applying the
strict scrutiny test to determine whether the statute denies due process.87
The court also determined that homosexuality is not a suspect class; thus,
only a rational relation threshold was required to analyze equal protection claims
based upon sexual orientation.88 The court found that the prohibition against
same-sex marriage was rationally related to the legitimate government interests of
promoting procreation and stable child rearing.89 The court concluded that it is
not its role to declare same-sex marriage to be a fundamental right in advance of
the legislature so declaring or the Supreme Court so holding. 90
(2) The state, its agencies, and its political subdivisions may not give effect to any public act,
record, or judicial proceeding of any state, territory, possession, or tribe of the United States
or of any other jurisdiction, either domestic or foreign, or any other place or location
respecting either a marriage or relationship not recognized under subsection (1) or a claim
arising from such marriage or relationship.
(3) For purposes of interpreting any state statute or rule, the term "marriage" means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the term "spouse"
applies only to a member of such a union.
83. Wilson, 2005 WL 281272 at *1.
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id. at **3.4. The Wilson court found that "[a] dismissal for lack of a substantial federal question
constitutes an adjudication on the merits that is binding on lower federal courts." Id. at *3 (citing
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975)).
86. Id. at *4.
87. Wilson, 2005 WL 281272 at **4-6 (citing Lofton v. Sec. of Dept. of Children & Fam. Servs., 358
F.3d 804, 817 (11th Cir. 2004), rehearing en banc denied, 377 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied,
125 S. Ct. 869 (2005) (noting the proposition that Lawrence did not create a new fundamental right and
the fact that the court remained bound by the precedent of its circuit court of appeals)).
88. Id. at *6.
89. Id. at **7-8.
90. Id. at *8.
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B. State Defense of Marriage Acts
The states were equally alarmed by the Baehr decision and concerned that
they would be forced to recognize same-sex marriages from other states. As a
result, many states enacted their own DOMAs. The purpose of the state DOMAs
was similar to that of the federal one. Each defined marriage as between one man
and one woman and also provided that the state would not recognize a same-sex
marriage from another state. Over the course of the next several years, many
states passed DOMAs, so that by the spring of 2004, thirty-eight states had passed
such acts.9' Four of these acts took the form of constitutional amendments.
92
With the exception of a few statutes, these laws were in place by the late 1990s.
9 3
Some of the acts simply defined marriage as between one man and one woman,
leaving open the door for some type of domestic partnership or civil union, while
other states banned civil unions and domestic partnerships as well.
94
At least two state appellate courts have upheld their DOMAs in the face of
constitutional challenges. In Standhardt v. Superior Court,95 an Arizona appellate
court found that the state's interest in encouraging procreation within
heterosexual marriage is a legitimate state interest and a viable reason for the
state to distinguish between opposite-sex and same-sex couples.96 The court
explained that:
Indisputably, the only sexual relationship capable of producing children is one
between a man and a woman. The State could reasonably decide that by
encouraging opposite-sex couples to marry, thereby assuming legal and financial
obligations, the children born from such relationships will have better opportunities
to be nurtured and raised by two parents within long-term, committed relationships,
which society has traditionally viewed as advantageous for children. Because same-
sex couples cannot by themselves procreate, the State could also reasonably decide
that sanctioning same-sex marriages would do little to advance the State's interest in
ensuring responsible procreation within committed, long-term relationships,
97
In Morrison v. Sadler,98 an Indiana appellate court found that the state's
DOMA did not violate the Indiana Constitution.99 In this case, the plaintiffs were
members of same-sex couples who had entered into civil unions in Vermont and
were seeking to enforce those unions in Indiana. 1  The court undertook a lengthy
analysis, and as with the federal bankruptcy case decided in Florida, one day
earlier,"" also relied upon Baker v. Nelson for the proposition that the right to
91. See supra n. 2.
92. See supra n. 2 (Alaska, Hawaii, Nebraska & Nevada).
93. White Paper, supra n. 2, at 30-33.
94. Id.
95. 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2003).
96. Id. at 461-64.
97. Id. at 462-63.
98. 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. App. 2005).
99. Id. at 35.
100. Id. at 19.
101. Wilson, 2005 WL 281272. See supra nn. 81-90 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 40:381
12
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 40 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol40/iss3/2
SAME-SEX UNIONS
same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right.'°2 Accordingly, the court, in
discussing the standard for constitutional review, found that the contested
"statutes will survive Article I, § 23 scrutiny if they pass the most basic rational
relationship test., 10 3 The court proceeded to hold that the marital procreation
justification for the distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples is not
unreasonable or arbitrary.' 14
The court stated that the issue before it was:
[W]hether the recognition of same-sex marriage would promote all of the same state
interests that opposite-sex marriage does, including the interest in marital
procreation. If it would not, then limiting the institution of marriage to opposite-sex
couples is rational and acceptable under Article I, § 23 of the Indiana
Constitution.0 5
The court spent a considerable amount of time assessing the differences between
"natural" and other means of procreation and found that the "legislative
classification of extending marriage benefits to opposite-sex couples but not same-
sex couples is reasonably related to a clearly identifiable, inherent characteristic
that distinguishes the two classes: the ability or inability to procreate by 'natural'
means."1 6  The court declined to follow the analysis of either the Vermont
Supreme Court in Baker v. State'o' or the Massachusetts Supreme Court in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.'°8 The court also found that the denial
of the right to same-sex marriage does not violate the provisions of the Indiana
Constitution that protect core values. °9 Ultimately, then, the court's decision that
the Indiana DOMA does not violate the Indiana Constitution relies heavily on the
natural procreation distinction.
C. Vermont Opens the Door
Even as many state legislatures were quickly passing DOMAs, some courts
were taking contrary positions. In 1998, an Alaska trial court held that denying
same-sex couples the right to marry violated both the state constitutional right to
privacy and the state constitutional right to be free from discrimination.1 0 Before
the case could work its way to the highest state court, however, voters passed a
102. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 19-20.
103. Id. at 22. The court discussed the different standards for review under the Indiana and United
States Constitutions, noting that: "Unlike federal equal protection analysis, there is no varying or
heightened level of scrutiny based on the nature of the classification or the nature of the right affected
by the legislation," and finding that prior cases require "only that the disparate treatment accorded by
legislation, not the purposes of the legislation, be reasonably related to the inherent characteristics that
distinguish the unequally treated classes, although legislative purposes may be a factor considered in
making the reasonable relationship determination." Id. at 21-22 (citing Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72,
80 (Ind. 1994)) (emphasis omitted).
104. Id. at 23.
105. Id.
106. Morrison, 821 N.E.2d at 25.
107. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
108. 821 N.E.2d at 27-29.
109. Id. at 31-34.
110. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998).
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constitutional amendment defining marriage as between one man and one woman,
thereby effectively ending the lawsuit.11
It was therefore not until 1999 that another state supreme court upheld the
rights of same-sex couples to partake of the benefits of marriage. On December
20, 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court held that it violated the Common Benefits
Clause of the Vermont Constitution to deny to same-sex couples the same benefits
and privileges granted to married couples.'1 2  The court ordered that the
legislature remedy this constitutional infirmity, stating:
[U]nder the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont Constitution,... plaintiffs
may not be deprived of the statutory benefits and protections afforded persons of
the opposite sex who choose to marry. We hold that the State is constitutionally
required to extend to same-sex couples the common benefits and protections that
flow from marriage under Vermont law. Whether this ultimately takes the form of
inclusion within the marriage laws themselves or a parallel "domestic partnership"
system or some equivalent statutory alternative, rests with the Legislature.
Whatever system is chosen, however, must conform with the constitutional
imperative to afford all Vermonters the common benefit, protection, and security of
the law.
113
In response, the Vermont legislature created "civil unions," making it the
first state in the country to offer the same state benefits and protections to same-
sex couples as those extended to married couples."4 The state legislature chose
not to grant to same-sex couples the right to "marry." 5  Although there was
outrage and indignation in Vermont from various segments of society and a
backlash against the legislators who supported the civil union bill, l 16 the civil union
law has not changed since its enactment."'
111. Alaska Const. art. I, § 25. See also Brause v. State, 21 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001) (holding that
plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the state's refusal to grant them marriage licenses was made moot
by adoption of article 1, § 25).
112. Baker, 744 A.2d at 867.
113. Id.
114. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
115. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 8 ("Marriage is the legally recognized union of one man and one
woman.").
116. See e.g. Fred Bayles, Vermont's Gay Civil Unions Mostly Affairs of the Heart, USA Today Al
(Jan. 7, 2004); Carolyn Lochhead, Gay Rights Law Starts Civil War in Vermont: A State Divided
Expects Political Leaders to Feel the Heat at Ballot Box on Election Day, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/10/30/MN43018.DTL (Oct. 30, 2000); Patti Reid, Activists
Warn Civil Union Equity Law Vulnerable, http:l/www.womensenews.org/article.cfmldynaid/728 (Nov.
20, 2001); Debra Rosenberg, State of the "Union": A Law Allowing Gays to All but Marry Has Divided
the Pastoral State of Vermont. "It's Like North and South," Says One Woman, Newsweek 56 (Oct. 23,
2000); Ross Sneyd, Backlash Over Vt. Civil Unions Law, http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/
a39b6ad3d6352.htm (Sept. 6, 2000).
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D. Interstate Recognition of Vermont Civil Unions
There is no requirement in the Vermont civil union law that the parties to
the civil union be residents of the state of Vermont.' As a result, the vast
majority of parties entering into civil unions in Vermont has been out-of-state
residents.1 9 After traveling to Vermont to enter into a civil union, the parties
return to their states of residence, where such unions do not exist and are
generally not recognized.1 20 Under the federal DOMA, each individual state's
DOMA, and the public policy exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
states are not required to grant rights, including the right to terminate the union,
to parties in civil unions.
Parties to civil unions cannot simply return to Vermont to dissolve their civil
unions. Though they do not have to reside there to enter into a civil union,
Vermont does require residency to dissolve one. 12 1 This requirement is identical
to the one for divorce; that is, the person filing to dissolve the union must be a
resident of Vermont for six months prior to filing.122 Thus, at least one of the
parties to the civil union would have to move and establish residency in Vermont
for a period of six months before being able to dissolve the union there. As a
result, the number of dissolutions of civil unions in Vermont is very low.) 23
There have been lawsuits in several states seeking recognition of civil unions,
but, generally speaking, there has not been widespread success. For example, a
Connecticut appellate court held that a civil union entered into in Vermont did
not constitute a marriage under Connecticut law and therefore the civil union
could not be dissolved in Connecticut) 2 4  The court opined that since the
legislature could have elected to enact legislation permitting either same-sex
marriage or civil unions but had failed to do so, a public policy opposing such
unions had been articulated.'25
118. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207.
119. Vt. Civ. Union Rev. Commn., Report § V, Finding 3, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/baker/Final%20
CURC%20Report%20for%202002.htm (Jan. 2002). As of January 4, 2002, over 4,371 civil unions had
been entered into in Vermont, the majority by non-residents. In 2002, approximately 89% of civil
unions were between non-residents. Id.
120. See supra n. 2 and accompanying text.
121. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1206 (2002) provides:
The family court shall have jurisdiction over all proceedings relating to the dissolution of
civil unions. The dissolution of civil unions shall follow the same procedures and be subject
to the same substantive rights and obligations that are involved in the dissolution of
marriage in accordance with chapter 11 of this title, including any residency requirements.
122. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 592 (2002) ("A complaint for divorce or annulment of marriage may be
brought if either party to the marriage has resided within the state for a period of six months or
more....").
123. gaydemographics.org, Vermont Civil Unions, Comparison to Marriage and to Divorces in
Vermont, http://www.gaydemographics.orgIUSA/states/vermont/2000Census-statevt-civilunions.htm
(accessed Mar. 20, 2005).
124. Rosengarten v. Downs, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 2002), cert. granted, 806 A.2d 1066 (Conn.
2002) (limiting the issue on appeal to the question of whether the lower court properly concluded that
the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to dissolve a civil union entered into in Vermont).
125. Id. at 179.
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This issue was also recently presented to a Texas trial court that initially
granted a dissolution to a same-sex couple. 26 After the dissolution was granted,
the attorney general intervened.127 The petitioning spouse then withdrew his
petition, as he was not financially able to fight the attorney general.' 8 Because the
petition for dissolution was withdrawn,129 there was no opportunity for the
decision to be appealed and thus there is no higher court ruling on the ability of
partners in civil unions to have those unions dissolved in Texas. 3 °
In Burns v. Burns,' the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled against the validity
of a Vermont civil union. The court held that the civil union did not make one
party legally related to the other and that the civil union could not substitute for
132legal marriage. At issue in this case was the interpretation of a consent decree
under which Susan Burns and her ex-husband were both prohibited from having
an unrelated adult spend the night when their children were present. 13  Burns's
ex-husband filed a contempt action on the basis that Burns was cohabitating with
her female partner. 34 The trial court agreed and Burns appealed, arguing that the
civil union satisfied the terms of the consent order. 35 The appellate court found
that the parties were not "related" by virtue of their civil union.
136
It is difficult, if not impossible, to know how many trial courts have quietly
and without much ado terminated civil unions. Those decisions have not been
appealed. The reported decisions generally involve cases in which the lower
courts refused to recognize the civil union. There are, however, a few known
instances in which a Vermont civil union has been recognized elsewhere. One
such instance occurred in West Virginia, where a trial court ordered a civil union
dissolved.
137
Additionally, an Iowa trial court granted a divorce to a lesbian couple who
had entered into a Vermont civil union. 38 A group of plaintiffs petitioned for
certiorari, arguing that as members of the public, taxpayers, state and federal
legislators, a minister, and a church, they had standing, and that the district court






131. 560 S.E.2d 47 (2002).
132. Id. at 49.
133. Id. at 48.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 49.
137. Bernstein, supra n. 127 (indicating that said dissolution was obtained in the case of In Re The
Marriage of Gorman, case number 02-D-292, in the Family Court of Marion County, West Virginia on
December 19, 2002).
138. See CNN.com, L. Ctr., Iowa Court to Review Case of Two Women's Divorce Pact: Congressman,
State Lawmakers Try to Block Judge's Ruling, http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/02/04/lesbian.divorce.
ap/ (Feb. 4, 2004).
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exceeded its authority in dissolving the civil union.139 Certiorari was granted on
February 3, 2004.14° A decision has not yet been rendered.
In a significant decision involving civil unions, a New York appellate court
recently recognized the right of a partner in a civil union to sue under the state's
wrongful death statute, holding that he was a "spouse" for purposes of the
statute.41 The court found that the plaintiff had standing to bring suit and that, in
fact, to find otherwise would be a denial of equal protection.142  The court
analyzed the existing law in New York with regard to same-sex couples, citing, for
example, the fact that New York had not passed a DOMA, and concluding that
recognizing the Vermont civil union did not violate the public policy of the state. 43
A classic example of the problems that are going to increasingly arise in
enforcing rights arising out of civil unions is being played out in a case involving a
Virginia trial court's refusal to enforce a Vermont order dissolving a civil union
and granting parenting rights.'"4 This case is significant because it has resulted in
conflicting orders from two states, a situation for which there is no resolution.
45
In this case, the parties (Janet and Lisa) lived in Virginia and traveled to
Vermont for the purpose of entering into a civil union. 46 They returned to
Virginia and conceived a child through artificial insemination, choosing Lisa to
bear the child. Subsequently, they moved to Vermont and established legal
residence there. The parties later ended their relationship and Lisa and the child
returned to Virginia while Janet remained in Vermont. A couple of months after
leaving, Lisa returned to Vermont to seek a dissolution of the civil union. She
sought an order for custody and child support. The court entered an order
granting Janet visitation rights in both Vermont and Virginia. Unhappy with this
order, Lisa filed an action in Virginia, asking the Virginia court to re-decide the
case, giving her sole parenting rights and denying Janet even the right of visitation
with the child. 47  Significantly, she filed this action the day after Virginia's
Affirmation of Marriage Act,14 which prohibits Virginia from recognizing out-of-
state civil unions, went into effect.
49
Subsequently, the Vermont court entered an order giving Janet equal
parental rights, finding that Janet had all of the legal rights that a parent in a
marriage would have, and found Lisa in contempt for her refusal to comply with
139. Iowa Jud. Branch, Case Statement, Alons v. Iowa District Court for Woodbury County
http://www.judicial.state.ia.us/supreme/oralargO3-1982.asp (accessed Mar. 20, 2005).
140. Id.
141. Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital of N.Y, 765 N.Y.S.2d 411,420-21 (Sup. Ct. 2003).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 415-16. For an excellent analysis of the case, see Emily Stein, Student Author, Case Note:
Langan v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 48 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 871 (2004).
144. Equality Virginia, FAQ: Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, http://www.equalityvirginia.org/site/
pp.asp?c=dflIITMIG&b=262607 (accessed Mar. 20,2005).
145. Id. at "What is the legal controversy?"
146. Id. at "Who are the parties to the case?"
147. Id.
148. Va. Code Ann. § 20-45.3 (2004).
149. Equality Virginia, supra n. 144, at "Why is it significant that Lisa filed her Virginia proceeding
on July 1, 2004?"
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Vermont's orders.150  Janet has also filed an action in Virginia challenging
Virginia's exercise of any jurisdiction in the case.15' Pursuant to both the federal
Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act ("PKPA")'52 and Virginia's Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA"),"3 a state may not
exercise child custody jurisdiction if another state is already properly exercising
jurisdiction and must enforce the orders of the state exercising jurisdiction so long
as the exercise of jurisdiction is proper.' 4 Therefore, under normal circumstances,
Virginia would be prohibited from exercising jurisdiction in such a matter.
However, the trial court judge in Frederick County, Virginia found that the
Virginia Affirmation of Marriage Act trumped the PKPA and both Virginia's
UCCJEA and Vermont's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act,'55 and ruled
116that the court did not have to uphold the Vermont court orders. The case is
currently on appeal in Virginia. 57 The issue is whether the Affirmation of
Marriage Act overrides federal and state law designed to prevent the exact type of
forum shopping that occurred in this case. 158 This fact pattern is on all fours with
many similar cases involving removing children from a court's jurisdiction for the
purpose of obtaining a different result elsewhere. 59 Courts will now have to
determine whether state DOMAs or similar acts will supercede these laws. If they
find that they do, instances of child removal and conflicting court orders could
become a serious interstate problem.
III. THE YEAR OF SEISMIC CHANGE AND ITS AFTERMATH: 2003 AND 2004
Three separate legal events occurred in 2003 that represented an earth-
shaking shift in the landscape, from which the fallout is still being felt. Within two
weeks of each other, an appellate court in Ontario held that denying same-sex
couples the right to marry violated the Canadian Constitution,16° and the United
States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Texas sodomy statute, expressly
overruling Bowers v. Hardwick.161 A few months later, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court dropped a bombshell when it declared that denying same-sex
couples the right to marry violated the Massachusetts Constitution.162 While the
actions of a Canadian court have no legal bearing in the United States, the fact
that our nearest neighbor to the north was going to legalize gay marriage caused
an uproar that resulted in a new call-to-arms by opponents of equal rights for
150. Id. at "What is the legal controversy?"
151. Id.
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2000).
153. Va. Code Ann. §§ 20-146.1 to 20-146.38 (LEXIS 2004).
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a); Va. Code Ann. § 20-146.24.
155. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1031-1051 (LEXIS 2002).
156. Equality Virginia, supra n. 144, at "What happened in the Virginia Court?"
157. Id.
158. Id. at "What is at stake in the appeal?"
159. Id.
160. Halpern v. Toronto (City), (2003) 225 D.L.R. 529 (Ont. Ct. App.).
161. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
162. Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 941 (2003).
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same-sex couples. Although many European countries had already recognized
the rights of same-sex partners in various forms (including, in two countries,
marriage), 63 the impact of this recognition was not felt here in the United States
until our closest neighbor paved the way for same-sex marriage. These three legal
decisions signaled recognition of the rights of same-sex couples in a previously
unheard of manner. Each of these decisions bears detailed examination.
The reaction to these events reflected a renewed determination to ban same-
sex marriage. In light of the Canadian decisions and in anticipation of similar
decisions in the United States, a resolution was introduced in the House of
Representatives on May 10, 2003, calling for a constitutional ban on same-sex
marriage.' 64 On November 25, 2003, immediately after the Goodridge decision,
Senate Joint Resolution 26, calling for a federal marriage amendment, was
introduced in the Senate. Furthermore, many states began moving forward withS . 165
plans to amend their own constitutions.
A. Canada Legalizes Gay Marriage
In sweeping terms, the Ontario Appellate Court stated that the case before it
was "ultimately about the recognition and protection of human dignity and
equality in the context of social structures available to conjugal couples in
Canada."'166 Recognizing that throughout Canada's history, marriage has been
defined as between one man and one woman, 167 the court summarized the central
163. See White Paper, supra n. 2, at 36-38 (indicating that the Netherlands and Belgium both permit
same-sex marriage, and that many other European countries grant legal recognition to same-sex
relationships and/or grant legal rights to same-sex partners, including Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden).
164. H.R. Jt. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (May 21,2003).
165. Infra pt. IV(E).
166. Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 2. The court began its decision with a discussion of the meaning of
human dignity, quoting Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (1999) 1 S.C.R. 497
at 530, which stated:
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is
concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment. Human dignity is
harmed by unfair treatment premised upon personal traits or circumstances which do not
relate to individual needs, capacities, or merits. It is enhanced by laws which are sensitive to
the needs, capacities, and merits of different individuals, taking into account the context
underlying their differences. Human dignity is harmed when individuals and groups are
marginalized, ignored, or devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognize the full place of all
individuals and groups within Canadian society.
Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 3. The court also cited the Ontario Human Rights Code, Preamble,
R.S.O, ch. H. 19 (1990) (Can.) at Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 4, which states:
[Ilt is public policy in Ontario to recognize the dignity and worth of every person and to
provide for equal rights and opportunities without discrimination that is contrary to law, and
having as its aim the creation of a climate of understanding and mutual respect for the
dignity and worth of each person so that each person feels a part of the community and able
to contribute fully to the development and well-being of the community and the Province.
167. Halpern, 225 D.L.R. at 1. The court stated:
The definition of marriage in Canada, for all of the nation's 136 years, has been based on
the classic formulation of Lord Penzance in Hyde v. Hyde (1886), L.R. 1 P.D. 130 (Eng.
P.D.A.), at 133: "I conceive that marriage, as understood in Christendom, may for this
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question in the appeal as whether the exclusion of same-sex couples from the
definition of marriage violates Canadian law, specifically, the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms §§ 2(a) and 15(1).' 68
Sexual orientation had previously been found to be a protected classification
in Canada.169 The court noted that previous same-sex equality litigation had
focused on such areas as bereavement leave, health care and pension benefits, and
spousal support, but that this appeal went to the heart of the issue of human
dignity itself and whether denying the right of marriage to same-sex couples
denies human dignity.170  It is important that Canada had previously passed
legislation extending federal benefits and obligations to all unmarried couples that
have cohabitated in a conjugal relationship for at least one year, regardless of
sexual orientation. 7' The court was also influenced by the fact that two other
provincial courts had already declared a ban on same-sex marriage to be
unlawful. 72 It is significant that the court was not concerned with the historical
definition of marriage as between one man and one woman, as this evidenced its
173
willingness to embrace judicial progressivism.
The court undertook an in-depth analysis of whether the common law
definition of marriage as between one man and one woman violates Section 15(1)
purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the
exclusion of all others."
Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 7 (citing M. v. H, (1999) 2 S.C.R. 3 and Egan v. Canada, (1995) 2 S.C.R. 513). After
citing Egan and M. v. H. to support sexual orientation as a protected classification, the court quoted
from the former:
In Egan.... this Court unanimously affirmed that sexual orientation is an analogous ground
to those enumerated in s. 15(1). Sexual orientation is "a deeply personal characteristic that
is either unchangeable or changeable only at unacceptable personal costs." In addition, a
majority of this Court explicitly recognized that gays, lesbians and bisexuals, "whether as
individuals or couples, form an identifiable minority who have suffered and continue to
suffer serious social, political and economic disadvantage."
Id. (citations omitted).
170. Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 8.
171. Id. at 128.
172. Id. at $ 31-33 and EGALE Canada, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), (2003) B.C.J. No. 994
(B.C. C.A.).
173. Id. at 1 42. The court explained: "[T]o freeze the definition of marriage to whatever meaning it
had in 1867 is contrary to this country's jurisprudence of progressive constitutional interpretation." Id
The court further stated:
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing a statute.
A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is enacted and as easily repealed. A
constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye toward the future. Its function is to provide a
continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when joined
by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and
liberties. Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must,
therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet new social, political and
historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the
constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions, bear these considerations in mind.
Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 42.
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of the Canadian Charter.174 As a starting point for its analysis, the court pointed
out the express purpose of that Section:
It may be said that the purpose of s. 15(1) is to prevent the violation of essential
human dignity and freedom through the imposition of disadvantage, stereotyping, or
political or social prejudice, and to promote a society in which all persons enjoy
equal recognition at law as human beings or as members of Canadian society,S175
equally capable and equally deserving of concern, respect and consideration.
In the first instance, the court evaluated whether "the common law definition of
marriage draws a formal distinction between opposite-sex couples and same-sex
couples on the basis of their sexual orientation."'76 The court- determined that
there is a distinction, and then turned to an analysis of the impact of the
differential treatment of same-sex couples within the context of the Charter.
177
The court noted that, while it must examine both the purpose and the effect of the
law in question, it need not find both a discriminatory purpose and a
discriminatory effect, as either will suffice. 8
As part of its analysis, the court discussed the historic disadvantage and
vulnerability of homosexuals as a class. 17  In determining whether the law was
discriminatory, the court further analyzed the correlation between the grounds on
which the claim is based and the actual needs, capacities, or circumstances of the
174. Id. at 59 ("Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without
discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical
disability." quoting Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 15(1)).
175. Id. at 60 (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 529).
176. Id. at 65.
177. Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 67. The court's approach requires it to:
[D]etermine whether the differential treatment, by imposing a burden upon or withholding a
benefit from the claimant in a manner which reflects the stereotypical application of
presumed group or personal characteristics, or which otherwise has the effect of
perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable or worthy of
recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society, equally
deserving of concern, respect, and consideration.
Id. at 61 (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 548-49).
178. Id. at 80. The court stated:
[A]ny demonstration by a claimant that a legislative provision or other state action has the
effect of perpetuating or promoting the view that the individual is less capable, or less worthy
of recognition or value as a human being or as a member of Canadian society.., will suffice
to establish an infringement of s. 15(1).
Id. (quoting Law, 1 S.C.R. at 535) (emphasis in original).
179. Id. at 1 82-84. The court found that:
The historic disadvantage suffered by homosexual persons has been widely recognized and
documented. Public harassment and verbal abuse of homosexual individuals is not
uncommon. Homosexual women and men have been the victims of crimes of violence
directed at them specifically because of their sexual orientation .... They have been
discriminated against in their employment and their access to services. They have been
excluded from some aspects of public life solely because of their sexual orientation .... The
stigmatization of homosexual persons and the hatred which some members of the public
have expressed towards them has forced many homosexuals to conceal their orientation.
This imposes its own associated costs in the work place, community and in private life.
Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 83.
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claimant or others possessing similar traits. 8° The court found that "the common
law requirement that marriage be between persons of the opposite sex does not
accord with the needs, capacities and circumstances of same-sex couples" and
concluded that "this factor weighs in favour of a finding of discrimination."' 8 ' The
court was dismissive of the Ontario Attorney General's argument that only
opposite-sex couples can procreate, noting that, while only opposite-sex couples
can "procreate" within the traditional meaning of the word, "[a]n increasing
percentage of children are being conceived and raised by same-sex couples."8
The court was clear that legislation granting to same-sex couples the benefits
afforded married couples would not cure the discrimination; indeed, it found that
denial of access to the institution of marriage itself is discriminatory and violative
of the Charter.8 3 Once it had determined that the common law requirement that
marriage be between one man and one woman was discriminatory, the court
turned to an analysis of whether the violation of the Charter was justified,
specifically, whether there was a valid objective to justify maintaining marriage as
a solely heterosexual institution.' 84 The court was very pointed in its rejection of
upholding such a distinction just because it historically has been the case. 185 It
further rejected the government's argument that uniting opposite-sex couples,
procreation, and the raising of children justified restricting marriage to opposite-
sex couples. The court found that the government failed to demonstrate "any
180. Id. at 88.
181. Id. at 95. The court disagreed with the argument of the attorney general that "marriage
relates to the capacities, needs and circumstances of opposite-sex couples" and that the concept of
marriage, across all societies, legal cultures and time is "that of an institution to facilitate, shelter and
nurture the unique union of a man and a woman who, together, have the possibility to bear children
from their relationship and shelter them from within it." Id. at 89. The court clarified that "the
purpose and effects of the impugned law must at all times be viewed from the perspective of the
claimant," rather than any other individual or group. Id. at 91. The court, therefore, found that the
"question to be asked is whether the law takes into account the actual needs, capacities and
circumstances of same-sex couples, not whether the law takes into account the needs, capacities and
circumstances of opposite-sex couples." Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 91.
182. Id. at. 1 93.
183. Id. at 107-08. The court called attention to the fact that:
[S]ame-sex couples are excluded from a fundamental societal institution-marriage. The
societal significance of marriage, and the corresponding benefits that are available only to
married persons, cannot be overlooked. Indeed, all parties are in agreement that marriage is
an important and fundamental institution in Canadian society. It is for that reason that the
claimants wish to have access to the institution. Exclusion perpetrates the view that same-
sex relationships are less worthy of recognition than opposite-sex relationships. In doing so,
it offends the dignity of persons in same-sex relationships.
Id. at 107.
184. Id. at 108.
185. Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 117. The court stated:
No one is disputing that marriage is a fundamental societal institution. Similarly, it is
accepted that, with limited exceptions, marriage has been understood to be a monogamous
opposite-sex union. What needs to be determined, however, is whether there is a valid
objective to maintaining marriage as an exclusively heterosexual institution. Stating that
marriage is heterosexual because it always has been heterosexual is merely an explanation
for the opposite-sex requirement of marriage; it is not an objective that is capable of
justifying the infringement of a Charter guarantee.
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pressing and substantial objective for excluding same-sex couples from the
institution of marriage., 186 It therefore concluded that restricting marriage to
heterosexual couples violated same-sex couples' rights under § 15(1) of the
Charter.187
The court, therefore, undertook to redefine marriage itself, finding that a
constitutional amendment was unnecessary and that courts have jurisdiction to
alter the common law definition of marriage. 88 The court held that the common
law definition of marriage shall be "the voluntary union for life of two persons to
the exclusion of all others., 189 The court ordered that the change be effective
immediately and that marriage licenses be issued to same-sex couples. 19°
Within a year of the issuance of Halpern, ten Canadian provinces and one of
three territories legalized same-sex marriage. 19' Members of the Canadian
Parliament drafted legislation that would legalize same-sex marriage throughout
Canada, but rather than passing it immediately, elected to submit it to the Canada
Supreme Court for an advisory opinion on its constitutionality.' 92 On December 9,
2004, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled that legislation legalizing same-sex
marriage was constitutional. 193 This decision further fueled the determination of
those opposing same-sex marriage in the United States to seek passage of the
federal marriage amendment. 94
B. The United States Supreme Court Overturns Sodomy Statute
On June 26, 2003, a mere two weeks after the Canadian decision was
announced, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Lawrence v.
Texas.' 95 In this case, the Court held that the Texas statute that made it a crime
for people of the same sex to engage in certain sexual conduct violated the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution, finding that the liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual adults to "choose to enter upon this relationship
in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their
dignity as free persons."'6 The questions before the Court were whether the
Texas sodomy statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution,
whether it violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, and whether
186. Id. at 125.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1 149-153.
189. Halpern, 225 D.L.R. 529 at 154.
190. Id.
191. Rona Marech, Top Court in Canada Oks Gay Marriage: Lawmakers Sought Ruling Before
Introducing Bill, http://sfgate.comlcgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2004/12/10/
MNG20A9TUS1.DTL (Dec. 10, 2004).
192. In the Matter of Section 53 of the Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, 2004 S.C.R. 79 (at this
time publication pages are not available for this document).
193. Id.
194. See infra pt. IV(E).
195. 539 U.S. 558.
196. Id. at 567.
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Bowers v. Hardwick97 should be overruled.19 8 The decision is significant in many
respects, including the language the Court chose to utilize in its analysis, its
express overturning of the Bowers decision, its reliance on the Due Process Clause
rather than the Equal Protection Clause, and the fact that it is not a unanimous
opinion. Justice Scalia's shrill dissent has garnered almost as much attention as
the decision itself.
As the Texas statute only proscribed certain sexual acts between members of
the same sex (as opposed to the Georgia statute upheld in Bowers, which
proscribed certain sexual activity between heterosexual couples as well), the Court
could have elected to decide this case on equal protection grounds, as did Justice
O'Connor in her concurring opinion.'9 However, the Court concluded that:
[T]he case should be resolved by determining whether the petitioners were free as
adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. For this inquiry,
we deem it necessary to reconsider the Court's holding in Bowers.
20 0
The Court began its analysis of Bowers with a tracing of the "substantive
reach of liberty under the Due Process Clause in earlier cases, 20' beginning with
Griswold v. Connecticut.2°2 It was in Griswold that the Court held that a right of
privacy existed.2 °3  Griswold was followed within the decade by Eisenstadt v.
Baird,20 4 which extended the right of privacy to non-married individuals. 2 5 The
Court continued its analysis with a discussion of its decision in Roe v. Wade.
2 6
Lastly, the Court mentioned its decision in Carey v. Population Services
International,2°7 wherein it invalidated a New York law that forbade the sale of
contraceptives to persons under sixteen.20°
197. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
198. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564.
199. Id. at 565, 579-85.
200. Id. at 564.
201. Id.
202. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (overturning a state law prohibiting the use of drugs or devices that
interfered with conception, as well as the counseling, aiding or abetting of someone using drugs or
devices of contraception).
203. Id. at 483-85.
204. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
205. In Eisenstadt, the Court invalidated a law that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to
unmarried people. Although the case was decided under the Equal Protection Clause instead of the
Due Process Clause, the Eisenstadt Court found the law to be in conflict with basic individual rights,
stating:
It is true that in Griswold the right to privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship.... If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.
Id. at 453.
206. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565 (citing Rowe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman's
right to an abortion, while not absolute, did have protection as an exercise of her liberty under the Due
Process Clause)).
207. 431 US. 678 (1977).
208. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566.
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The Court concluded that the state of the law at the time that Bowers was
decided was that the right of privacy was not limited to married people. 2°9 The
Court pointed out that the inherent flaw in the Bowers Court's framing of the
issue presented was that it did not appreciate the liberty interest at stake.210 The
Court pointed out that the statutes in question, both in Bowers and in Lawrence,
"seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals., 21   The Court undertook a lengthy historical analysis of
laws affecting homosexuality, finding that "there is no longstanding history in this
country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter., 212 The Court
went on to criticize Justice Berger's sweeping summary of history as it relates to
homosexual behavior, finding it to be overstated and inaccurate.213 The Court
scolded the Bowers Court for failing to rely upon the law as it had developed over
the more recent past, citing "an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial
protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex, 214 and that this "emerging recognition should have
been apparent when Bowers was decided., 2 5 The Court also chastised the Bowers
Court for ignoring historical developments that conflicted with its decision as well
as recent developments elsewhere of significance.216 In addition to its criticism of
the reasoning in Bowers itself, the Court found that two opinions issued after
Bowers (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey217 and Romer
v. Evans"") made the decision even more suspect.
219
209. Id.
210. Id. at 566-67. In Bowers, the Court stated that the issue before it was whether the Constitution
confers a fundamental right of privacy to engage in homosexual conduct, specifically, sodomy, rather
than whether the Constitution confers a right of privacy generally. 478 U.S. at 190.
211. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
212. Id. at 568. The Court pointed out that laws prohibiting sodomy historically have not been
enforced against consenting adults but rather were enacted to prosecute predatory sexual acts against
non-consenting individuals. Id. at 569. The Court further found that laws directed at homosexuality
did not, in fact, have "ancient roots" as claimed by the Court in Bowers, noting that laws targeting
same-sex couples did not come about until the last third of the twentieth century and that the first state
law criminalizing same-sex relations was not enacted until the late 1970s. Id. at 569-70.
213. Id. at 568-71 The court noted that: "Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct
have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of Western civilization. Condemnation
of those practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards." Id. at 571 (quoting
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196).
214. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
215. Id. The Court pointed out that in 1955 the American Law Institute promulgated the Model
Penal Code, which made clear that private sexual conduct should not be criminalized. Id.
216. ld. at 572-73. The Court indicated that a law similar to the Georgia statute was struck down by
the European Court of Human Rights five years before the Bowers decision. Id. at 573. That decision,
which colors the Bowers Court's finding that the claim pursued by the plaintiff was insubstantial in
Western civilizations, was authoritative in all member nations at that time (of which there were 21).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
217. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). In Casey, the Court reaffirmed the right of liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause, stating:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
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The Court expressly rejected deciding this case on equal protection grounds,
leaving open the question of whether the statute in question could survive scrutiny
if it applied equally to homosexual and heterosexual couples. Rather, the Court
concentrated on the continued validity of the Bowers decision, stating that "its




Recognizing that the "criticism of Bowers has been substantial and continuing"222
223
and further acknowledging that stare decisis is not absolute, the Court held that
"Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought
not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is
overruled.
2 24
Despite the strong historical legal precedent for the right of privacy and for
the right of individuals to live their personal lives in a free manner and with
dignity, three justices dissented from this decision, and two asserted that such a
right should not exist for homosexuals. 225 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, wrote a scathing dissent about both the decision
itself and its underlying reasoning, opining that "[sitate laws against bigamy, same-
sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication,
bestiality, and obscenity 2 26 are all called into question by this decision. The
dissent disagreed that a right of liberty actually exists under the Due Process
Clause, pointing out that the Fourteenth Amendment expressly permits states to
proscribe liberty so long as due process is provided.22 7 The dissent scathingly
criticized the overruling of Bowers, asserting that the decision therein was correct
and further suggesting that the majority in the present case was attempting to
make homosexuality a fundamental right, though "the Court does not have the
boldness" 228 to say so. The dissenting opinion skewered the majority's holding
that there was no rational basis for the sodomy statute, stating that: "This
proposition is so out of accord with our jurisprudence-indeed, with the
jurisprudence of any society that we know-that it requires little discussion. 2 29
In biting language, the dissenting opinion criticized the majority opinion as
judicial activism by a "Court... that has largely signed on to the so-called
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under the compulsion of the State.
Id. at 851.
218. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
219. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
220. Id. at 574-75.
221. Id. at 575.
222. Id. at 576.
223. Id. at 577.
224. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
225. Id. at 586-606 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J., & Thomas, J.).
226. Id. at 590.
227. Id. at 592 (citing the Fourteenth Amendment: "No state shah... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without the due process of law." (emphasis omitted)).
228. Id. at 594.
229. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 599 (emphasis in original).
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homosexual agenda."230 In the strongest possible terms, Justice Scalia warned that
this decision was the harbinger of things to come, namely, that the next logical
progression in this reasoning would be the legalization of same-sex marriage.
231
The dissenters worried that the majority has in effect made homosexuality a
fundamental right, even though the majority was clear that it is the right to liberty
and privacy that is fundamental.232 The dissenting opinion's criticism of judicial
activism and promotion of social change through means other than the courts flies
in the face of some of the greatest decisions in the Court's history. To argue that
the law should not change until societal views catch up would negate such
decisions as Loving v. Virginia233 and Brown v. Board of Education.234 It is evident
that the majority of society at the time those cases were decided did not favor
integrated schools or interracial marriage. However, such societal attitudes did
not prevent the Court from remedying these terrible wrongs. For the dissenting
justices to argue that the Court should not take positions that deviate from the
mainstream disregards historic jurisprudence. Even though they pay lip service to
the history of the Court in engaging in exactly such activity, their condemnation of
the practice in this case is disingenuous. Thus, at the end of the day, one-third of
the justices on the Supreme Court determined that the Texas statute criminalizing
certain sexual conduct between homosexuals should be allowed to stand as
constitutional.
230. Id. at 602. Justice Scalia decried this shift in roles from "neutral observer" to "taking sides in
the culture war," pointing out: "Many Americans do not want persons who openly engage in
homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their
children's schools, or as boarders in their home." Id.
231. Id. at 604. Justice Scalia stated:
At the end of its opinion-after having laid waste the foundations of our rational-basis
jurisprudence-the Court says that the present case "does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek
to enter." Do not believe it. More illuminating than this bald, unreasoned disclaimer is the
progression of thought displayed by an earlier passage in the Court's opinion, which notes
the constitutional protections afforded to "personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education," and then
declares that "[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do." Today's opinion dismantles the structure of
constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and
homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned. If moral
disapprobation of homosexual conduct is "no legitimate state interest" for purposes of
proscribing such conduct; and if, as the Court coos (casting aside all pretense of neutrality),
"[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the
conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring," what justification
could there possibly be for denying the benefits of marriage to homosexual couples
exercising "[tihe liberty protected by the Constitution".... This case "does not involve" the
issue of homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have
nothing to do with the decisions of this Court. Many will hope that, as the Court
comfortingly assures us, this is so.
Id. at 604-05 (citations omitted).
232. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604-05.
233. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
234. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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C. Massachusetts Declares Ban on Same-Sex Marriage Unconstitutional
The most dramatic legal development in the United States in 2003 was the
Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public
Health. It was without question the shot heard around the world, or at least
around the United States. The decision became a call to arms for conservatives to
press for a federal constitutional amendment. Although the decision was based
upon the Massachusetts, not the United States, Constitution, concern about the
spread of legalized same-sex marriage was profound. 25 Numerous amicus briefs
were filed by groups presenting legal, religious, and mental health perspectives.
2 36
The court had amassed before it a wealth of information related to all possible
aspects of this highly controversial issue.237 It is clear from a reading of the
opinion that the court weighed all of the information before it, and also
considered much of the dicta of Lawrence, in rendering its opinion. 23 The court
distinguished the Massachusetts Constitution from the federal Constitution,
noting that: "The Massachusetts Constitution is, if anything, more protective of
individual liberty and equality than the Federal Constitution; it may demand
broader protection for fundamental rights; and it is less tolerant of government
intrusion into the protected sphere of private life. 239
The court divided the question before it-whether the marriage restriction
violated the Massachusetts Constitution-into two queries: whether the
restriction was a denial of equal protection and whether the restriction violated
due process of law. It pointed out, however, that in matters of marriage and
children, the two concepts overlap."4° The court recognized the substantial
benefits enjoyed by those in marriages and pointed out that: "Because it fulfils
yearnings for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common
humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and
whom to marry is among life's momentous acts of self-definition., 241 The court
then discussed some of the benefits attached to marriage that are not available to
242
unmarried persons , concluding that: "It is undoubtedly for these concrete
reasons, as well as for its intimately personal significance, that civil marriage has
long been termed a 'civil right.'
' 243
Significantly, the court analogized the prohibition on same-sex marriage to
the earlier prohibition on interracial marriage, stating:
As both Perez and Loving make clear, the right to marry means little if it does not
include the right to marry the person of one's choice, subject to appropriate
235. See supra n. 4 and accompanying text.
236. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 946-47.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 948.
239. Id. at 948-49.
240. Id. at 953.
241. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955.
242. Id. at 955-57.
243. Id. at 957 (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12).
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government restrictions in the interests of public health, safety and welfare. In this
case, as in Perez and Loving, a statute deprives individuals of access to an institution
of fundamental legal, personal, and social significance-the institution of
marriage-because of a single trait: skin color in Perez and Loving, sexual
orientation here. As it did in Perez and Loving, history must yield to a more fully
developed understanding of the invidious quality of the discrimination.
244
After analyzing the safeguards of the Massachusetts Constitution to protect
liberty and equality, the court found that: "The liberty interest in choosing
whether and whom to marry would be hollow if the Commonwealth could,
without sufficient justification, foreclose an individual from freely choosing the
person with whom to share an exclusive commitment in the unique institution of
civil marriage., 245 The court went on to find that the marriage ban could not meet
the rational basis test under either due process or equal protection analysis.24
The court made short shrift of the argument propounded by the State that
the primary purpose of marriage is procreation, finding that: "Our laws of civil
marriage do not privilege procreative heterosexual intercourse between married
people above every other form of adult intimacy and every other means of
creating a family. ' ' 247 The court, in strong language, found that this argument
relative to procreation "confers an official stamp of approval on the destructive
stereotype that same-sex relationships are inherently unstable and inferior to
opposite-sex relationships and are not worthy of respect.",
248
The second argument put forth by the state in favor of maintaining the ban
on same-sex marriage was that limiting marriage to heterosexual couples ensures
that children are raised in an "optimal" environment.24 9 The Court shredded this
assertion, pointing out its flawed reasoning and finding no rational relation
between the ban on same-sex marriage and the goal of rearing children in an
optimal environment.250 Instead, the court found that:
Excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage will not make children of opposite-
sex marriages more secure, but it does prevent children of same-sex couples from
enjoying the immeasurable advantages that flow from the assurance of "a stable
family structure in which children will be reared, educated, and socialized." 1
In fact, the court found that the ban on same-sex marriage penalized the children
of same-sex relationships by depriving them of state benefits and that this penalty
244. Id. at 958 (citations omitted).
245. Id. at 959.
246. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960-61. The court further concluded that since the statute could not
meet the rational basis test, it was unnecessary to determine whether the statute required strict
scrutiny, thus skirting the issue of whether the statute concerned a fundamental right. Id.
247. Id. at 961. Rather, the court pointed out that it is the exclusive and permanent commitment of
the partners to each other that forms the underpinning of marriage, not having children. Id.
248. Id. at 962.
249. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962.
250. Id. at 963-64. The court discussed the many benefits, both tangible and intangible, not available
to children whose parents are not married, pointed to the difficult process that same-sex couples must
often undertake to establish their joint parentage, and expressed concern for the repercussions for
children when a same-sex relationship ends. Id.
251. Id. at 964 (citation omitted).
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was not rational. 2. The court likewise disposed of the state's third claim, which
was that the statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage preserved economic
resources,23 holding that a "statutory ban on same-sex marriage bears no rational
relationship to the goal of economy.
' '254
Finally, the court took on the argument propounded most often by
opponents of same-sex marriage: that legalizing same-sex marriage will
undermine, if not destroy, the very institution of marriage.25  In the strongest
possible terms, the court concluded:
Here, the plaintiffs seek only to be married, not to undermine the institution of
civil marriage. They do not want marriage abolished. They do not attack the binary
nature of marriage, the consanguinity provisions, or any of the other gate-keeping
provisions of the marriage licensing law. Recognizing the right of an individual to
marry a person of the same sex will not diminish the validity or dignity of opposite-
sex marriage, any more than recognizing the right of an individual to marry a person
of a different race devalues the marriage of a person who marries someone of her
own race. If anything, extending civil marriage to same-sex couples reinforces the
importance of marriage to individuals and communities. That same-sex couples are
willing to embrace marriage's solemn obligations of exclusivity, mutual support, and
commitment to one another is a testament to the enduring place of marriage in our
laws and in the human spirit.
256
The court, in dismissing the argument propounded by the dissent that this
decision usurped the role of the legislature, pointed out that it has always been the
role of courts to interpret constitutions2 57 Citing the principle that the history of
constitutional law "is the story of the extension of constitutional rights and
protections to people once ignored or excluded," 2 8 the court found that this is as
true in the arena of civil marriage law as in other civil rights arenas. 2 9 Ultimately,
the court found the prohibition against same-sex marriage to be nothing more
than blatant discrimination against homosexuals.2 °
252. Id.
253. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 964. The state claimed that same-sex couples are more financially
independent than heterosexual couples and therefore less in need of the financial benefits associated
with marriage. Id.
254. Id. The court pointed out that many same-sex couples have children in their care and also that
married people receive economic benefits from the fact of the marriage itself, regardless of any
demonstration of need. Id.
255. Id. at 965.
256. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 965.
257. Id. at 966 ("To label the court's role as usurping that of the Legislature is to misunderstand the
nature and purpose of judicial review. We owe great deference to the Legislature to decide social and
policy issues, but it is the traditional and settled role of courts to decide constitutional issues.").
258. Id. at 966 (quoting U.S. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996) (involving the exclusion of women from
a public military institute)).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 968. The court found that:
The marriage ban works a deep and scarring hardship on a very real segment of the
community for no rational reason. The absence of any reasonable relationship between, on
the one hand, an absolute disqualification of same-sex couples who wish to enter into civil
marriage and, on the other hand, protection of public health, safety, or general welfare,
suggests that the marriage restriction is rooted in persistent prejudices against persons who
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The court stayed its order for 180 days to permit the legislature to enact
legislation consistent with its decision.26' Subsequently, the legislature requested
an advisory opinion from the court as to whether the enactment of a civil union
law would comply with the court's order. The court unequivocally found that it
262would not. The court found that the proposed legislation suffered from an
inherent defect, specifically, that it continued to define "marriage" as between one
man and one woman and attempted to create an institution that is parallel but not
the same as marriage.263 The court stated emphatically that "the history of our
nation has demonstrated that separate is seldom, if ever, equal.' '264 Therefore, the
court ordered that only full marriage rights for same-sex couples would pass
constitutional muster.265
Although the Goodridge decision made abundantly clear that the
Massachusetts Constitution affords greater protections than does the United
States Constitution and further acknowledged that its decision can and should go
no further than the state's own borders, the national reaction to the decision was
nothing short of mass hysteria. Afraid that homosexual marriage would be
imposed throughout the land, Congress and many states urged the passage of
constitutional amendments forever banning same-sex marriage.
D. Proposed Federal Constitutional Amendment
The first proposed constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage
was introduced in the House of Representatives prior to the issuance of any of the
three decisions discussed above. It is safe to surmise, however, that the rumblings
of change had been heard and the results were being anticipated with dread. On
May 21, 2003, House Joint Resolution 56 was introduced by Representative
Marilyn Musgrave. The proposed amendment stated:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution or the constitution or any State, nor state or
federal law, shall be construed to require that marital status or the legal incidents
266thereof be conferred upon unmarried couples or groups.
are (or who are believed to be) homosexual.... Limiting the protections, benefits, and
obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples violates the basic premises of individual
liberty and equality under law protected by the Massachusetts Constitution.
Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 968 (citations omitted).
261. Id. at 970.
262. See Op. of the JJ. to the Sen., 802 N.E.2d 565, 572 (Mass. 2004) ("The bill maintains an
unconstitutional, inferior, and discriminatory status for same-sex couples, and the bill's remaining
provisions are too entwined with this purpose to stand independently.").
263. Id. at 568-72.
264. Id. at 569.
265. Id. at 571-72.
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It was not until immediately after the Goodridge decision that the Senate
267
companion bill was introduced.
On the eve of the first hearing on House Joint Resolution 56 before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, a substitute amendment was submitted.26
The wording in the substitute amendment differed from the original proposed
amendment and provided:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a
woman. Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be
construed to require that marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon
any union other than the union of a man and a woman.269
The proposed constitutional amendment, both in its original form and its
substitute form, was in direct response to the Goodridge decision, and its sole
unambiguous purpose was to prevent the judiciary from interpreting either the
federal constitution or any state constitution to require the recognition of same-
sex marriage. The proponents of this court-stripping amendment did not want a
court anywhere in the fifty states to be legally permitted to interpret either the
federal Constitution or its own state constitution in a manner that would legalize
same-sex marriage or even legalize civil unions ("the legal incidents thereof").
The other purpose of this proposed amendment was to protect against the
possibility that a federal judge would find the federal DOMA to be
unconstitutional.2 70 Simply put, the proponents seek to make a ban on same-sex
marriage bulletproof.
It is not clear why the language was changed to remove the words "nor state
or federal law" from the substitute proposed amendment, nor is an interpretation
of this language easily accomplished. At first blush it appears to imply that
although a constitution cannot be interpreted to require that states recognize
same-sex marriage or civil unions, a state law could be so interpreted. In other
words, if a state legislature, on its own and not under court order, wished to pass a
civil union law, such a law might be permissible, although not required under the
state or federal Constitution. However, the language also states that marriage in
the United States would be defined as between one man and one woman, which is
no different than the current language of the federal DOMA but is in the form of
a constitutional amendment. It is therefore open to interpretation as to whether
the language defining marriage only as between one man and one woman would
be for the purposes of federal law only, in other words, for the purpose of denying
271federal rights and benefits to same-sex couples. These interpretation issues,
267. Sen. Jt. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (Nov. 25, 2003) (Nov. 25, 2003) (introduced by Sen. Wayne Allard
(R-Colo.)).
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among others, have caused legal experts to disagree on the probable
12interpretation of the proposed amendment.
Some insight into the interpretation of that language can be garnered from
the House of Representatives hearing on House Joint Resolution 106, which is the
substitute amendment identical to the Senate substitute proposed amendment.
273
According to Representative Steve Chabot, Chair of the House Subcommittee on
the Judiciary, "[t]he first sentence of the amendment ensures that a common
definition of marriage, that between a man and a woman, exists for the entire
Nation. This will preclude attempts by the judiciary or State legislatures to
determine otherwise. 274 In urging the passage of this resolution, Chabot stated,
contrary to well-established constitutional law, that "marriage is an institution, not
a right., 275 Under his explanation of the proposed resolution, state legislatures
would be free to define the terms and conditions of civil unions or domestic
partnerships as they see fit, although under no circumstances would they be
permitted to legalize same-sex marriage.276
Senate Joint Resolution 30 did not get voted out of committee; therefore,
proponents of a federal marriage amendment decided to go directly to the full
Senate. On July 7, 2004, Senate Joint Resolution 40,277 identical to Senate Joint
Resolution 30, was introduced in the Senate and scheduled for a vote.278 A motion
to proceed was made on July 9, 2004,279 but the Republicans were unable to invoke
cloture and the motion to proceed was withdrawn on July 15, 2004.m The House
version was debated but a vote never occurred. At this time, resolutions are still
pending in both houses of Congress.
Proponents of a federal marriage amendment have long been concerned, as
expressed in the hearings on the amendment in both the Senate and the House,
that the federal DOMA did not provide sufficient protection against judges
272. See Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage, supra n. 5, at 5-9. Senator Diane Feinstein
asked if states would be able to permit same-sex marriage or civil unions through either referendum or
statute but not through constitutional amendment. The legal experts, including this author, did not
view the proposed language as clear and unambiguous as to whether states, through non-court
mandated legislation, could legalize same-sex marriage and civil union so long as it was not through a
constitutional amendment. Id. See also White Paper, supra n. 2, at 33.
273. H.R. Jt. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (Sept. 23, 2004):
Marriage in the United States shall consist solely of the union of a man and a woman.
Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that
marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of
a man and a woman.
274. 121 Cong. Rec. H7899 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 2004).
275. Id.
276. See id.
277. Sen. Jt. Res. 40, 108th Cong. (July 7, 2004) states:
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a man and a woman. Neither
this Constitution, nor the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that
marriage or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the union of
a man and a woman.
278. 150 Cong. Rec. S7755 (daily ed. July 7, 2004).
279. 150 Cong. Rec. S7901 (daily ed. July 9, 2004).
280. 150 Cong. Rec. S8150 (daily ed. July 15, 2004).
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interpreting the constitution to require same-sex marriage and could be declared
unconstitutional. There have been no successful challenges to the federal DOMA;
as previously revealed in Section II of this article, a bankruptcy court in
Washington 81 and a federal district court in Florida have now upheld the Act. 2
E. State Constitutional Amendments
Up until 2004, most states were satisfied that their marriage laws were
adequately protected by DOMAs. Prior to 2004, only four states had amended
283their constitutions to define marriage as between one man and one woman.
However, with the rendering of the Goodridge decision, many states became
concerned that their DOMAs could be declared unconstitutional by "activist
judges" such as those in Massachusetts. Since same-sex couples were first
permitted to marry in Massachusetts in May 2004, fourteen states have passed
constitutional amendments defining marriage as between one man and one
woman.284 Eleven of these amendments were passed in the November 2004
general election. The majority of these constitutional amendments ban domestic
partnerships and civil unions as well.285 Additionally, three states have passed
laws that will amend their constitutions but only if re-approved by their legislature
and then approved by the voters by ballot measure.286 Of these three, the
Massachusetts amendment would ban same-sex marriage but expressly create civil
unions.287 The Wisconsin proposed amendment would ban civil unions and
domestic partnerships. 28
At the present time, therefore, the vast majority of states have either passed
constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage or enacted DOMAs
(which accomplish the same objective), or both. A few states, however, have
affirmatively elected to provide rights and benefits to same-sex couples.2 89
281. Kandu, 315 B.R. 123.
282. Wilson, 2005 WL 281272.
283. Alaska (Alaska Const. art. I, § 25); Hawaii (Haw. Const. art. I, § 23); Nebraska (Neb. Const. art.
I, § 29); Nevada (Nev. Const. art. I, § 21).
284. Arkansas (Ark. Const. art. I. § 25); Georgia (Ga. Const. art. I, § IV); Kansas (Kan. Sen. Con.
Res. 1601, 2005-2006 Leg. (Jan. 13, 2005) (amending Kan. Const. art. XV)); Kentucky (Ky. Const. §
233A); Louisiana (La. Const. art. XII, § 15); Michigan (Mich. Const. art. I, § 25); Mississippi (Miss.
Const. § 263-A); Missouri (Mo. Const. art. I, § 33); Montana (Mont. Const. art. XIII, § 7); North
Dakota (N.D. Const. art. XI, § 28); Ohio (Ohio Const. art. XV, § 11); Oklahoma (Okla. Const. art. II, §
35); Oregon (Or. Const. art. XV, § 5a); Utah (Utah Const. art. I, § 29).
285. These states include Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah.
286. The states of Massachusetts (Mass. H. 3190, 183rd Leg., Jt. Sess. 1482 (Mar. 29, 2004)),
Tennessee (Tenn. H. Jt. Res. 990, 104th Gen. Assembly (May 6, 2004); Tenn. Sen. Jt. Res. 31, 104th
Gen. Assembly (Mar. 17, 2005)), and Wisconsin (Wis. Assembly Jt. Res. 66, 2003-2004 Leg. (Mar. 5,
2004); Wis. Sen. Jt. Res. 63, 2003-2004 Leg. (Mar. 11, 2004)), all must seek re-approval from their state
legislatures.
287. Mass. H. 3190, 183rd Leg., Jt. Sess. 1482.
288. Wis. Assembly Jt. Res. 66; Wis. Sen. Jt. Res. 63.
289. See infra pt. V.
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IV. AREAS OF LAW AFFECTED BY ISSUES RELATED TO SAME-SEX COUPLES
The areas of law that are affected by the issues facing same-sex couples are
wide-ranging, in terms of both federal and state benefits. In a study updated in
2004, the Government Accountability Office identified 1,138 rights,
responsibilities, and privileges that attach to marital status.29g Those benefits are
not available to same-sex couples in the United States, even if they have been
legally married in Massachusetts or elsewhere. 29' Additionally, there are many
benefits offered at the state level that accrue to married couples, as well as
benefits offered through the private sector, mainly employers, which are generally
available only to married couples.
29
The area of law that most readily comes to mind relating to same-sex unions
is family law. In the vast majority of states, when a same-sex union terminates, the
members of that union cannot seek assistance through the family courts. While
married people seeking to terminate their marriages can request a division of
property, custody rights, spousal support, and other rights arising out of the
divorce statutes, same-sex couples, who face the very same issues, often have no
legal remedy. While some of these issues, such as how property will be
distributed, can be addressed in written cohabitation agreements, many others
cannot. Many states do not recognize any claim whatsoever for support in same-
sex relationships, nor in most states can a non-biological parent seek custody of
minor children.
The lack of parental status has resulted in children being removed from their
de facto parent in the event of the death of the biological parent.293 In those
instances, the child suffers the loss of both parents simultaneously and is often
removed geographically and emotionally from the non-biological parent.
Likewise, in the event of the termination of the relationship, the non-biological
parent has generally been unable to obtain the status of a parent for purposes of
custody proceedings.294 Many courts have found de facto parent status but only
295for the purpose of awarding visitation.
290. GAO, Rpt. No. 04-353R: Defense of Marriage Act: Update to Prior Report 1, http://www.gao.
gov/new.items/dO4353r.pdf (Jan. 23, 2004).
291. See id.
292. See White Paper, supra n. 2, at 22-29.
293. See e.g. McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. App. 1995) (holding that a lesbian co-
parent was not entitled to custody after the death of the biological mother, despite the existence of a
power of attorney and a will designating the co-parent as the child's legal guardian). See also ABA,
Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, Section of Family Law, Steering Committee on the
Unmet Legal Needs of Children, National Lesbian and Gay Law Association, Report to the House of
Delegates, Recommendation, http://www.abanet.org/irr/annual2003/finalsecondparent.doc (Aug. 12,
2003) [hereinafter Recommendation] ("Resolved, That the American Bar Association supports state
and territorial laws and court decisions that permit the establishment of legal parent-child relationships
through joint adoptions and second-parent adoptions by unmarried persons who are functioning as a
child's parents when such adoptions are in the best interests of the child.").
294. See e.g. Nancy S. v. Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831, 841 (1991) (holding that even if the non-
biological parent could establish that she was a de facto parent, she could not seek custody or visitation
over the objections of the biological mother and could be granted custody only upon a showing that a
granting of custody to the biological mother would be detrimental to the child); Curiale v. Reagan, 222
Cal. App. 3d 1597, 1600 (1990) (holding that the non-biological parent lacked standing to establish a
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Some recent decisions have recognized the rights of non-biological parents
as parents for custody purposes. The Maine Supreme Court was the first to
recognize a non-biological parent's right to seek custody in C.E.W. v. D.E.W. 296 In
this case, a lesbian couple had decided to conceive a child through artificial
insemination.297 Both women changed their last names and entered into a written
parenting agreement to the effect that they would co-parent the child equally.2 98
The parties subsequently separated and signed another parenting agreement
setting forth their post-separation rights and responsibilities with regard to the
child. 299 The parties acknowledged the court's ultimate authority to determine
legal residence and other issues. 3°° Subsequently, the non-biological parent filed
an action for the court to declare her parental rights and responsibilities and the
biological parent asserted that only she was the "parent" of the child.30 The trial
court entered summary judgment in favor of the non-biological parent after the
parties stipulated that she had functioned as the child's de facto parent throughout
his life.3°2 The Maine Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, holding
that as the child's de facto parent, she had standing to seek parental custody
rights.0 3
Likewise, a Washington state appellate court ruled that although a non-
biological mother did not have standing pursuant to any statutory authority to
seek shared parenting or visitation, she did have a common law right to do so as a
de facto parent.3°4 That case is currently on appeal to the Washington Supreme
Court.3 °5 Additionally, an Indiana appellate court recently held, as a matter of
law, that "when two women involved in a domestic relationship agree to bear and
raise a child together by artificial insemination of one of the partners with donor
semen, both women ate the legal parents of the resulting child." 3°
The issue of children and adoption has been widely addressed in many state
courts.30 7 A second-parent adoption is one where a partner legally adopts the
parent-child relationship); Kazmierazak v. Query, 736 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 4th Dist. App. 1999)
(holding that a psychological parent is not entitled to the same status as the biological parent).
295. See e.g. S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9 (Md. Spec. App. 2000) (holding that a non-biological mother
had standing to seek visitation as a de facto parent but that the trial court could deny visitation using
the best interests standard); In re H.S.H. -K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), cert. denied sub non. Knott v.
Holtzman, 516 U.S. 975 (1995) (holding that court had equitable jurisdiction to allow a non-biological
parent to seek visitation, where the non-biological parent could prove that the legal parent had
consented to and fostered the parent-child relationship, because she had performed parental functions
and a parent-child bond was formed).
296. 845 A.2d 1146 (Me. 2004).




301. CE.W., 845 A.2d at 1147-48.
302. Id. at 1148.
303. Id. at 1152.
304. In re Parentage of L.B., 89 P.3d 271, 284 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2004).
305. In re Parentage of L.B., 101 P.3d 107 (Wash. 2004).
306. In re Parentage of A.B., 818 N.E.2d 126, 132 (Ind. App. 2004).
307. See White Paper, supra n. 2, at 13-14.
[Vol. 40:381
36
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 40 [2004], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol40/iss3/2
SAME-SEX UNIONS
other partner's biological child.? A joint adoption is where both partners in a
same-sex couple adopt a child not biologically related to either of them. °9 It is not
difficult to understand the myriad of problems that may arise when only one
parent has a legal relationship to a child, including access to health care, the ability
to make health care decisions, lack of Social Security benefits, lack of inheritance
rights and the like. In the absence of a second-parent adoption, the child of a
same-sex relationship cannot benefit from Social Security and other inheritance
rights in the event of the death of the second parent.3 a° While the number of states
allowing second-parent adoptions is growing, it has not been universally
accepted. 31 The American Bar Association, however, adopted a recommendation
favoring second-parent and joint adoptions in 2003.312
Adoption by even one homosexual parent is not permitted by law in Florida,
313the only state to have such a prohibition. In Lofton v. Secretary of Department
of Children and Family Services,314 the Eleventh Circuit refused to strike down the
Florida law banning adoption by homosexuals.315 Disappointingly, the United
316States Supreme Court denied certiorari without opinion.
Many other areas of the law affect same-sex couples.317 There are many
rights related to health care that flow only to married couples. 318 For example,
couples not in marital relationships do not have a right of visitation in the hospital,
or the right to consent to medical treatment. Unmarried couples do not have the
right to take advantage of tax laws, cannot claim exemptions, and cannot file joint
tax returns. Unmarried couples cannot sue for loss of consortium or wrongful
death. They certainly cannot claim military benefits of any kind, or Social
Security benefits. They are also not entitled to be named as dependents for health
insurance or family leave purposes.
319
Many private employers have sought to provide benefits, particularly health
care benefits, to same-sex couples. 320 In 2004, there were 6,811 private sector
employers providing such health care benefits.321  Additionally, many
municipalities, universities, and some states are offering benefits to domestic
322partners. For example, New York has offered health benefits to domestic
partners, whether same-sex or heterosexual, since 1995. 2  The state of Oregon




312. See Recommendation, supra n. 293.
313. Fla. Stat. § 63.042(3) (2002).
314. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
315. Id. at 827.
316. 125 S. Ct. 869 (2005).
317. White Paper, supra n. 2, at 16-17.
318. Id. at 16.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 34.
321. Id.
322. White Paper, supra n. 2, at 34.
323. Id. at 27.
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has provided health insurance, life insurance, and long-term care benefits to same-
sex and opposite sex domestic partners since 1998.324 At the present time, in the
vast majority of jurisdictions, the benefits offered to same-sex partners is a
hodgepodge, some statewide, some in select municipalities, and none providing
benefits across the board.325 It is only in the jurisdictions that recognize domestic
partners on a statewide basis that any significant protection is afforded.326
V. STATUTORY PROTECTIONS FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES
A small minority of states have circumvented the trend of restricting or
eliminating rights of same-sex couples through legislation. As discussed above,
the first state to enact a civil union law was Vermont.3 27  The Act was all-
encompassing in nature and offered comprehensive rights and benefits to same-
sex couples.328 Vermont law states: "Parties to a civil union shall have all the same
benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they derive from
statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or any other sources of
civil law, as are granted to spouses in a marriage. 329  Civil unions are only
available to couples of the same sex.33° Just a few of these rights and
responsibilities are:
* the ability to utilize the law of domestic relations in full, including
annulment, separation, divorce, child support, child custody,
division of property, and maintenance;
331
* the ability to take advantage of the laws relating to title, ownership,
inheritance, descent, and distribution with respect to the ownership
of real estate;
33 2
* the ability to utilize prohibitions against discrimination based upon
marital status;
333
* the ability to access causes of action dependent on spousal status,
such as loss of consortium, emotional distress, and wrongful
death;
334
* the availability of group insurance for state employees; 335
* the availability of family leave benefits;
336
324. Id.
325. Id. at 22-29.
326. See id.
327. Supra pt. II(C).
328. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §§ 1201-1207 (2002).
329. Id. at § 1204(a).
330. Id. at § 1202.
331. Id. at § 1204(d).
332. Id. at § 1204(e)(1).
333. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(7).
334. Id. at § 1204(e)(2).
335. Id. at § 1204(e)(5).
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* the ability to adopt;337 and
* the availability of marital immunity and privilege.338
The law also explicitly puts both parties to a civil union on equal footing with
regard to parenting issues, stating that:
The rights of parties to a civil union, with respect to a child of whom either
becomes the natural parent during the term of the civil union, shall be the same as
those of a married couple, with respect to a child of whom either spouse becomes
the natural parent during the marriage.
339
As of January 1, 2005, the California Domestic Partner Registration Act,
340
which was originally enacted in 1999, became almost the equivalent of Vermont's
civil union laws in terms of the rights and benefits bestowed upon partners of civil
unions.341 Similar to the Vermont law, it states that:
Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights, protections, and
benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties
under law, whether they derive from statutes, administrative regulations, court rules,
government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources of law, as are
granted to and imposed upon spouses.342
On April 6, 2005, the Connecticut Senate passed Substitute Bill 963 creating
civil unions. Similar to Vermont's civil union law and California's Domestic
Partner Registration Act, Section 14 of the Bill states that:
Parties to a civil union shall have all the same benefits, protections and
responsibilities under law, whether derived from the general statutes, administrative
regulations or court rules, policy, common law or any other source of civil law, as343
are granted to spouses in a marriage.
The Connecticut House also passed the Bill on April 13, 2005, but added an
amendment that defines "marriage as the union of a man and a woman." 3" The
Connecticut Senate passed the bill as amended and the bill was signed into law by
the Governor on April 20,2005, making it the second state to create civil unions.345
336. Id. at § 1204(e)(12).
337. Id. at § 1204(e)(4).
338. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 1204(e)(15).
339. Id. at § 1204(0.
340. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 297-299.6 (2004).
341. One significant difference between the two laws is that the Vermont statute permits parties to a
civil union to be treated as married for purposes of state and municipal taxes. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, §
1204(e)(14). In contrast, the California statute requires domestic partners to file their state tax returns
using the same filing status as they use for federal income tax purposes. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. §
297.5(g).
342. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 297.5(a).
343. Conn. Sen. 963, 2005 Reg. Sess. (Apr. 6, 2005).
344. William Yardley, Connecticut House Backs Gay Civil Unions, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/
14/nyregion/14hartford.html (April 14, 2005).
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On January 12, 2004, a Domestic Partners Act 34 6 was signed into law in New
Jersey. While it grants many rights to domestic partners that are available to
married couples, it is not as sweeping or all-encompassing as the laws in Vermont
and California and does not purport to make domestic partners the equivalent of
spouses.
347
Several other states have enacted legislation offering certain specific benefits
to same-sex partners, such as health insurance for state employees, but these laws
are extremely limited in scope.34 Many municipalities also offer limited benefits,
such as health insurance for their employees.349
VI. CONCLUSION
It is safe to say that the issue of the rights of same-sex couples will continue
to be controversial and very much in the foreground of law and politics for the
indefinite future. Will we look back at this period in our history much as we now
look back at the institutional injustices remedied in the civil rights movement? At
that time, the Supreme Court rulings with regard to civil rights were not consistent
with the general will of the people or the legislatures. As a country, we now look
back through the lens of history at that period with shame and regret while at the
same time we applaud the Court's forward thinking on these issues and its
willingness to broadly interpret the Constitution.
It is likely that someday all of the newly passed state constitutional
amendments will be repealed and replaced with laws protecting same-sex couples.
Eventually it is likely that the United States will legalize same-sex marriage as
Canada has already done. As of the writing of this article, the country is in a
conservative mode, with the same people opposing same-sex marriage and civil
unions as are promoting the conservative marriage movement, which seeks to
make divorce more difficult. Polls indicate that the public is close to evenly split
on the issue of rights for same-sex couples in the form of civil unions, and that
although it is generally opposed to same-sex marriage, it does not want the United
States Constitution amended.3 0 There are now millions of children being raised
by same-sex couples. It is likely that as time goes on, more and more people will
become comfortable with the idea of rights for same-sex couples and will
recognize the impact of disparate treatment. At the same time, courts will in all
likelihood become more receptive to expanding rights of same-sex couples. If
history repeats itself, over time cultural mores will change in a manner that will be
inclusive of same-sex couples. Whether such a shift in public opinion and the law
will take years or decades remains to be seen.
346. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 26:8A-1 to 26:8A-12 (Supp. 2004).
347. See id.
348. See White Paper, supra n. 2, at 34.
349. Id.
350. PollingReport.com, Law and Civil Rights, http://www.pollingreport.com/civil.htm (accessed
Mar. 20, 2005) (Quinnipiac Univ. Poll).
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